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1   Introduction 
In the preface to the first edition of the International Journal of Unconventional 
Computation, the editorial board [1] welcomed papers in “information processing 
based on physics, chemistry and biology.” But the Board left undefined what it means 
to say (a) that a physical, chemical, or biological system is doing “information proc-
essing” or (b) that information processing is “based on physics, chemistry, or biol-
ogy.” In this paper we explore these issues by focusing on these questions. 
• What is computation?  
• How can computation be distinguished from other natural processes?  
• What is the relationship between ideas and computations? 
• What is the relationship between a computational process and the environment 
within which it occurs? 
Our conclusions will be that physical processes are considered computation when 
we treat them as externalized thought and that computation itself involves the playing 
out of fixed processes against a contingent environment. We re-interpret the Church-
Turing thesis: for a thought to be rigorous it should, at least in principle, be expressi-
ble as a computer program. A corollary is that we agree with Wegner [2] that the 
agent-based model of computation is the right way to think about interaction with an 
environment. But since we don’t understand how to model multi-scalar environments 
we are not in a position to model our understanding of how we interact with nature. 
1.1   Is Google reading my email? 
That’s the first question in the Google Gmail help center [3]. This question arises 
because Gmail places ads next to email messages, and the selection of ads is based on 
the contents of the messages. Google’s answer to this question has varied over time. 
On March 13, 2006, the posted answer was as follows. 
Google computers scan the text of Gmail messages in order to filter spam and de-
tect viruses, just as all major webmail services do. Google also uses this scanning 
technology to deliver targeted text ads and other related information. The process is 
completely automated and involves no humans. [Emphasis added.] 
In other words, Google’s computers are reading your email—but no human beings 
are. That most people find this reassuring illustrates the intuition that it’s what goes 
on in the mind of a human being that matters to us. 
One might object that if a computer is reading one’s email (and storing its contents 
in a database), a person might read it later. That’s quite true, and the fact that only 
Google computers (and not Google employees) are reading one’s email when select-
ing ads does not guarantee one’s privacy. But if no person ever reads one’s email, 
then most people will not feel that their privacy has been violated.  
After all, all email is read by a number of computers as it passes from sender to re-
ceiver. No one has ever worried about that. The moment of violation occurs when 
some living human being becomes consciously aware of one’s personal information.  
But, one might argue, the kind of reading that occurs when a computer transmits a 
message along a communication channel is different from the kind of reading that 
occurs when a Google computer determines which ads to place next to a message. 
The former treats messages as character strings; no meaning is extracted. The later 
extracts (or attempts to extract) meaning so that related ads can be displayed.  
This raises the question of what we understand by the term meaning. That’s clearly 
a larger topic than we can settle here, but our short answer is that our intuitive sense 
of meaning has something to do with an idea or thought forming in a mind.1 At this 
stage in the development of technology, most people don’t believe it makes sense to 
say that an idea has formed in the mind of a computer—or that a computer has a mind 
at all. We may speak informally and say something like “the computer is doing this 
because it thinks that.” But when we say these sorts of things, we are speaking meta-
phorically. Until we start to think of computers as having minds that have subjective 
experience, minds in which ideas can form—then most people will feel comfortable 
with Google’s reply that its computers, but no human beings, are reading one’s email. 
1.2   To come 
Section 2 continues the discussion of thoughts and introduces the notion of thought 
tools, for which it provides a brief history. Section 3 considers how computation 
might be defined. Section 4 discusses the agent-based computing paradigm as more 
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  This clearly is different from the formal semantics sense in which meaning refers to a map-
ping from an expression to a model. 
than just an approach to programming and modeling but as common to many of the 
ways we think about both thinking and our interaction with nature. 
2   Thinking and thought tools 
If a tree grows in a forest, but no one counts its rings is it counting years? Is it per-
forming an unconventional computation? If a tree grows in a forest but no one knows 
it’s there, is it instantiating the idea of a tree? These questions have the same sort of 
answers as does Bishop Berkeley’s famous question: if a tree falls in a forest with no 
one around to hear it, does it make a sound? 
Berkeley’s question is not as difficult as it seems. Our answer, which is different 
from Berkeley’s,2 is that one must distinguish between physical events and subjective 
experience. If a tree falls in a forest, it generates (what we call) sound waves whether 
someone is there to hear them or not. But if no one is there to hear the sound, if no 
being has a subjective experience of the sound, then no (subjective) sound is heard.  
The same holds for ideas. Like the subjective experience of a sound, the idea of a 
tree exists only as a subjective experience. If no one has that subjective experience, 
then a tree without anyone knowing about it will not be instantiating the idea of a tree. 
Even if one grants that the idea of a tree is exactly the right way to describe that par-
ticular aspect of nature, that idea exists only as an idea, and it exists only in the mind 
of someone who is thinking it. Ideas exist only within the realm of mental events, i.e., 
as subjective experience. In saying this we are taking an explicitly anti-Platonist 
stance: there is no realm outside the mind in which ideas exist on their own.3  
This is not intended as mystical or profound—just a statement of a brute fact: an 
idea is something that occurs only in someone’s mind. The ideas in this paper exist 
only in the mind of the author and the minds of the readers as the author and readers 
are thinking them. These ideas don’t exist on the paper or on the computer screens on 
which these words appear. They don’t exist in the computer memory in which these 
words are stored. Just as the moment at which an invasion of privacy occurs is when 
some being-with-a-mind learns something personal about us, an idea exists only when 
someone is thinking it.4 We go to such lengths to make this point because our position 
is that computations, like ideas, are also mental events, but mental events that we have 
externalized in a way that allow us to use physical processes to perform them. 
When a tree grows rings, it just grows rings. But when we use that tree-ring growth 
as a way to count years, i.e., to help us work with ideas such as the idea of a year, then 
we can say that the tree has performed a computation—an unconventional one. 
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  Berkeley’s answer is that it makes a sound because God, who is always everywhere, hears it. 
3
  We are not taking a stand on nominalism vs. realism. Although we believe that our (human) 
ideas about how nature should be described are not arbitrary and that entities other than the 
elementary particles exist (see Abbott [4]), that is not at issue here.  
4
  This position requires some care in formulation. If an idea exists only when someone is 
thinking it, what does it mean to say that two people have or had “the same” idea? We be-
lieve that these issues can be worked out. 
When a computer runs is it computing?  Our answer is the same. A computer is 
computing only when it is understood to be performing some externalized mental 
activity. Otherwise, it’s just an arena within which electrons are moving about.  
2.1  A brief history of the internalization and then the externalization of thought  
One may trace one thread through the history of thought as the internalization and 
then the externalization of thought. Initially we looked outward for answers to ques-
tions about how to make sense of the world. Not knowing what else to do, we looked 
to sources of what we hoped were authority: priests, oracles, prophets, sacred writ-
ings, divinities, etc., to tell us what thoughts to install in our minds.5  
We often fought with each other about whose sources of knowledge were right. In 
a recent op-ed piece [5] Lorenzo Albacete, a Roman Catholic priest, articulated the 
position of those who fear the use of religion as a source of knowledge. 
For [nonbelievers], what makes Christianity potentially dangerous [is not its 
other-worldliness but] its insistence that faith is … the source of knowledge about 
this world. 
As Albacete later notes, by the time of the Roman Empire, the use of religion as a 
source of ideas about how nature works had been discarded by enlightened thinkers. 
Greek and Roman philosophers believed that they themselves could be a source of  
knowledge about the world. The step from looking for external sources of knowledge 
to supposing that perhaps we can figure it out for ourselves is what we are referring to 
as the internalization of thought—attributing to oneself the power to produce thoughts 
of value and rejecting the notion that thoughts must originate externally to be valid.  
2.2 Externalizing thought and tools to work with it 
The history of early computing may be traced along three paths. Each path traces 
devices that help us think about a particular (and fundamental) subject area: time, 
counting (arithmetic), and space (geometry).  
2.3   Time computers 
We used natural processes to help us express our ideas about time—the daily, 
monthly, and yearly cycles of the earth, moon, and sun. Not to beat this point into the 
ground, day, month, and year are ideas. As ideas, they exist only in the mind—no 
matter how accurate or true they are as descriptions of nature.  
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  One wonders what priests, oracles, prophets, and other human authorities believed about how 
the ideas they transmitted arrived in their own minds. Perhaps they believed that the ideas 
had been implanted in their minds as a result of their special status or as a result of some spe-
cial words or rituals that they performed. Perhaps they were just transmitting ideas that had 
been transmitted to them. Presumably they didn’t believe that they themselves made up these 
ideas. Most likely they didn’t ask themselves this question. 
The first (analog6) time computers were the actual processes that corresponded to 
our thoughts. The rising and setting of the sun were the physical events that we used 
to keep track of the mental events: the start and end of a day. Similarly for the moon. 
Yearly events such as river floodings and the comings and goings of the seasons 
helped us keep track of the mental event: the yearly cycle. 
It didn’t take us long to invent more sophisticated analog computers. The sundial, 
for example, is an analog computing device. The position of the sun’s shadow is an 
analog for the mental event time-of-day which corresponds to the physical relation-
ships between the relative positions of the sun and the earth. 
It is worth noting that with the sundial we started to arrange physical materials to 
help us track our thoughts. In building sundials we set up shadow casters, which in 
conjunction with the sun and markings on the surface on which the shadow is cast, 
helped us track (our ideas about) the passing of the day. Presumably this was not a 
very significant step from using existing shadow-casting objects, e.g., trees, for the 
same purpose. Hence our title: if a tree casts a shadow, is it telling the time? 
2.4   Number computers 
Apparently we started to count quite early. Bones with notches carved into them ap-
peared in western Europe 20,000 to 30,000 years ago. There is evidence of the use of 
a tally system—groups of five notches separated from each other. With tally systems 
not only did we mark physical materials to help us keep track of numbers (which are 
also mental events), we also invented ways to make counting easier by the way in 
which we arranged these markers, i.e., in groups. Soon we invented the abacus. 
With these primitive computers we separated the computational process from its 
dependency on natural processes. Sundials and astronomical masonry depend on the 
sun and the stars. Counting depends on nothing other than human activity. Once we 
invented computational devices that were independent of non-human physical proc-
esses it was a short step to written notation. By approximately 3,000 BC cuneiform 
writing on clay tablets using positional notation was known in Babylonia.  
2.5   Space computers 
Besides time and numbers, the Pythagoreans in Greece and Euclid in Egypt developed 
ways to think about space. We know that early geometers thought about construction 
issues. The straight edge and compass were their (human-powered) thought tools. 
They used them to externalize, to create representations of, and to manipulate the 
ideas of straight lines and circles. 
2.6   Is it reasonable to call abaci and geometers’ tools computers? 
Even though abaci and geometers’ tools are completely independent of non-human 
physical processes, i.e., they are entirely dependent on human activity to make them 
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  An analog computer is so called because can be understood as analogous to something else. 
“run,” we feel justified in calling them computers because they are used according to 
mechanical rules. Even though the source of energy for an abacus is the user, the 
abacus user follows strict rules—rules which could be automated.  
2.7   Thought tools for symbol manipulation 
Beyond time, numbers, and space, we have also built thought tools to represent sym-
bolic thoughts and relationships. Sowa [6] describes the Tree of Porphyry. 
The oldest known semantic network was drawn in the 3rd century AD by the 
Greek philosopher Porphyry in his commentary on Aristotle's categories. Porphyry 
used it to illustrate Aristotle's method of defining categories by specifying the genus 
or general type and the differentiae that distinguish different subtypes of the same 
supertype. 
Another attempt to externalize symbolic thought has been credited to Ramon Lull 
in the late 13th century. Smart [7] describes it as follows. 
Ramon Lull’s logic machine consisted of a stack of concentric disks mounted on 
an axis where they could rotate independently. The disks, made of card stock, 
wood, or metal, were progressively larger from top to bottom. As many as 16 words 
or symbols were visible on each disk. By rotating the disks, random statements were 
generated from the alignment of words. Lull’s most ambitious device held 14 disks. 
The idea for the machine came to Lull in a mystical vision that appeared to him 
after a period of fasting and contemplation. It was not unusual in that day … scien-
tific advances to be attributed to divine inspiration. He thought of his wheels as di-
vine, and his goal was to use them to prove the truth of the Bible. …  
In “Gulliver’s Travels,” Swift satirizes the machine without naming Lull. In the 
story, a professor shows Gulliver a huge contraption that generates random se-
quences of words. Whenever any three or four adjacent words made sense together, 
they were written down. The professor told Gulliver the machine would let the 
most ignorant person effortlessly write books in philosophy, poetry, law, mathemat-
ics, and theology. 
This may be the first use of non-determinism in computing. 
Soon thereafter William of Ockham discovered the foundations of what were to 
become De Morgan’s laws of logic. More specifically, from Sowa [8]: 
(Ockham, 1323) showed how to determine the truth value of compound proposi-
tions in terms of the truth or falsity of their components and to determine the valid-
ity of rules of inference … in terms of the truth of their antecedents and consequents. 
2.8   Thought tools and the scientific process 
Clocks, abaci, straight-edges, hierarchies, non-determinism, laws of logic, and other 
thought tools differ in kind from microscopes, telescopes, and other scientific instru-
ments of observation. The former are intended to allow us to externalize and manipu-
late our thoughts. The latter allow us to investigate nature—to see what’s out there 
and perhaps to see things that will require new ideas to understand them. Thought 
tools are constructive; instruments of scientific observation are reductive. 
After having convinced ourselves that we are capable of generating our own ideas, 
an important next step was to realize the necessity of testing our ideas against nature. 
Simply coming up with an idea is not enough. It’s important both to externalize it as a 
way to work with it and to test it by looking at nature though it. Thus science consists 
fundamentally of three kinds of activity. (We are not arguing that these activates 
occur sequentially.) 
1. Observation. Uncovering new facts about nature.  
2. Reduction/invention. Reverse engineering nature to figure out how it may have 
harnessed understood principles to produce the observed facts. Although reverse 
engineering, i.e., reductionism,7 sounds unglamorous, it is fundamental. Deter-
mining that our genome is encoded as a double helix was reverse engineering. 
The invention aspect of reverse engineering is to imagine the design that nature 
uses to achieve an end. 
3. Creation/invention. Establishing new fundamental principles and then using 
them as the basis of the reverse engineering process. This occurs only in funda-
mental physics.  
Scientific instruments help us with (1). Thought tools help with (2) and (3). 
2.9   The state of the art of thought externalization 
Every computer application is a thought tool. The thoughts that are being manipulated 
are the thoughts that are represented by the conceptual model implemented by the 
application. More importantly every programming language is a thought tool. Pro-
gramming languages allows us to externalize in the form of computer programs our 
thoughts about symbolic behaviors. Since one writes computer applications in pro-
gramming languages, a programming language is a thought tool for building thought 
tools, i.e., a thought tool for externalizing thought.  
It is important to realize that a programming language is itself a computer applica-
tion. As a computer application, it implements a conceptual model; it allows its users 
to express their thoughts in certain limited ways, namely in terms of the constructs 
defined by the programming language. Since all modern programming languages are 
conceptually extensible—libraries allow us to extend the conceptual constructs de-
fined by the language—programming languages allow us to define concepts, which 
we can then use to build other concepts. As such they are very powerful thought tools. 
We are still learning how to use the power of computers to externalize thought. In 
one way or another, much of software-related research is about developing more 
powerful, more specialized, faster, easier to use, or more abstract thought tools. The 
more we learn about externalizing our thoughts the higher we ascend the mountain of 
abstraction and the broader the vistas we see. It seems appropriate that one current 
avenue of research, language for building models (UML and SysML) and languages 
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  Reductionism has recently received a lot of bad press. As explicated here, the reductionist 
impulse often leads to the development of important new ideas.   
for describing ontologies (the OWL Web Ontology Language), continue a tradition 
that dates back to Porphyry—and before.  
3   Defining computation 
In this section we turn to the question of how to define computation. It is surprisingly 
difficult to find a well considered definition. The one offered by Eliasmith [9] appears 
to be the most carefully thought out. Here is his definition and his commentary. 
Computation. A series of rule governed state transitions whose rules can be altered. 
There are numerous competing definitions of computation. Along with the initial 
definition provided here, the following three definitions are often encountered: 
1. Rule governed state transitions  
2. Discrete rule governed state transitions  
3. Rule governed state transitions between interpretable states  
The difficulties with these definitions can be summarized as follows: 
a) The first admits all physical systems into the class of computational systems, 
making the definition somewhat vacuous.  
b) The second excludes all forms of analog computation, perhaps including the 
sorts of processing taking place in the brain.  
c) The third necessitates accepting all computational systems as representational 
systems. In other words, there is no computation without representation on this 
definition.  
Contrary to Eliasmith we suggest the following. 
a) The notion of alterable rules is not well defined, and hence all physical systems 
are potentially computational systems.  
b) But, it is exactly the fact of interpretability that makes a physical process into a 
computation. (Eliasmith doesn’t explain why he rejects the notion that computation 
requires interpretation.) 
Eliasmith requires that the rules governing some identified state transitions must be 
alterable in order to distinguish a computation from a naturally occurring process—
which presumably follows rules that can’t be altered. But all computing that takes 
place in the physical world is based on physical processes. If we set aside the prob-
abilistic nature of quantum physics, and if we suppose that physical processes operate 
according to unalterable rules, it’s not clear what it means to say that it must be possi-
ble to alter a set of  rules.  
This is not just being difficult. Certainly we all know what it means to say that one 
program is different from another—that “the rules” which govern a computation, may 
be altered. But the question we wish to raise is how can one distinguish the altering of 
a program from the altering of any other contingent element in an environment? 
It is the particular program that is loaded into a computer’s memory that distin-
guishes the situation in which one program is being executed from that in which some 
other program is executing. But a computer's memory is the environment within 
which the computer’s cpu (or some virtual machine) finds itself, and a loaded pro-
gram defines the state of that environment. The cpu (or the virtual machine) is (let’s 
presume) fixed in the same way that the laws of nature are fixed. But depending on 
the environment within which it finds itself—i.e., the program it finds in its environ-
ment—the cpu operates differently, i.e., it performs a different computation.  
This same sort of analysis may be applied to virtually any natural process. When 
we put objects on a balance scale, the scale’s behavior will depend on the objects 
loaded, i.e., on the environmental contingencies.8 In both the case of programs loaded 
into a computer and objects put in the pans of a balance scale, we (the user) determine 
the environment within which some fixed process (i.e., the rules) proceeds.  
This brings us back to our original perspective. A process in nature may be consid-
ered a computation only when we use it as a way to work with externalized thought. 
A physical or otherwise established process—be it the operation of a balance scale, a 
cpu, the Game of Life, or the sun in motion with respect to trees and the ground—is 
just what it is, a fixed process.9 But for almost all processes,10 whether we create them 
or they arise naturally, how the process proceeds depends on environmental contin-
gencies. When we control (or interpret) the contingencies so that we can use the re-
sulting process to work with our own thoughts, then the process may be considered a 
computation. This is the case whether we control the contingencies by loading a pro-
gram into a computer, by placing objects on a balance scale, by establishing initial 
conditions for the Game of Life, or by giving meaning to shadows cast by trees.  
Consequently we agree with Eliasmith that it must be possible to alter a process for 
it to be considered a computation, but we would express that condition in other words. 
For a process to be considered a computation there must be something contingent 
about the environment within which it operates which both determines how it pro-
ceeds and determines how we interpret the result.  
In other words, we can always separate a computational process into its fixed part 
and its contingent or alterable part. The fixed part may be some concrete instances of 
the playing out of the laws of nature—in which case the contingent environment is the 
context within which that playing out occurs. Or it may be the operation of a cpu—in 
which case the contingent environment is the memory which contains the program 
that is being executed. Or it may be the operation of a program that a cpu is execut-
ing—in which case the contingent environment is the input to that program. A com-
putation occurs when we alter the contingencies in the environment of an fixed proc-
ess as a way to work with our thoughts. 
This perspective contrasts traditional (theoretical) computation with real-world 
computation. Traditionally, one thinks of a computation as a contingent process—one 
defined in a programming language. Like a Turing Machine, it runs for free. Real-
world computations result from non-contingent processes, have energy requirements, 
and operate in contingent environments.  
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  When a balance scale compares two objects and returns an “output” (selected from left-is-
heavier, equal-weights, and right-is-heavier), is it performing a computation? It is if we are 
using it for this purpose. It isn’t if we are using it as a designer setting for flower pots. 
9
  Of course many processes—such as the operation of a cpu and the operation of a balance 
scale—are what they are because we built them to be that way—because we anticipated us-
ing contingencies that we could control in their environment to help us think. 
10
 Some quantum processes may occur on their own without regard to their environment—
although even they are environmentally constrained by the Pauli exclusion principle.. 
3.1   Non-algorithmic computing 
A corollary of the preceding is that all computation performed by real-world proc-
esses are environmentally driven. Computing involves configuring environmental 
contingencies, i.e., setting up an environment within which a process (or multiple 
processes) will play itself (or themselves) out. We refer to this as non-algorithmic 
computing. The focus is on how an environment will shape a process, not on the algo-
rithm the shaped process will perform. A Game of Life glider has no algorithm. 
It may seem ironic that what we think of as conventional computation on real-
world computers is a constrained form of unconventional computation. We are at-
tracted to it because its single threaded linearity makes it easy to manage. But nature 
is not linear. Any computer engineer will confirm how much work it takes to shape 
what really goes on in nature into a von Neumann computer.  
Perhaps even more ironically, we then turn around and use conventional single-
threaded computers to simulate nonlinear unconventional computation. One might say 
that a goal of this conference is to eliminate the von Neumann middle man—to find 
ways to compute, i.e., to externalize our thoughts, by mapping them more directly 
onto the forces of nature operating in constrained environments. 
3.1   Turing Machines vs. Turing computability 
Why can’t we look to Turing Machines (and their equivalents) for a definition of 
computation that does not rely on the notion of thought externalization? Turing Ma-
chines, recursive functions, and equivalent models rely on the notions of symbols and 
symbol manipulation, which are fundamentally mental constructs. Eliasmith’s defini-
tion doesn’t—although his definition does depend on the notion of rule-governed state 
transitions, which appears difficult to define non-symbolically. The saving grace of 
states and state transitions is that they are intentional; they are our way of thinking 
about what happens in nature. Symbol manipulation is a purely mental activity. 
But Turing Machines and their equivalents offer an important insight. They iden-
tify symbol manipulation to be what we intuitively think of as computational activity. 
The Turing Machine model is our way of externalizing an entire class of mental ac-
tivities, the class that we intuitively identify as symbolic.  
In saying this we are separating (a) the sorts of computational activities character-
ized by Turing Machines, i.e., the Turing Machines themselves, from (b) the class of 
functions that these models compute, i.e., Turing computability. The various models 
of computational activities are all defined constructively, i.e., in terms of the opera-
tions one may perform when constructing a computational procedure. Furthermore, 
the equivalence proofs among the standard models are also constructive. We can 
constructively transform any Turing Machine into a recursive function and vice versa. 
The equivalence of these models shows that Turing Machines, recursive functions, 
etc. are equivalent as programming languages. 
Computability theory then takes the generic class of software defined in this way 
and applies it to the task of computing functions. But this second step isn’t necessary. 
What’s important about the Church-Turing thesis is not the class of functions that can 
be computed but the possible programs one can write. Our revised version of the 
Church-Turing thesis is that to be considered rigorous a thought process must, at least 
in principle, be expressible as a software. 
 
4   Agent-based computing 
The Turing Machine model is single threaded—as are the single processor von Neu-
mann computers that we built based on it. But many of our computer science (and 
other) thought models are either parallel, asynchronous, or non-deterministic. Not all 
rigorously defined models are linear and single threaded. We have as yet been unable 
to build thought tools to help us externalize these kinds of non-deterministic computa-
tional ideas. Attempts to perform non-deterministic computations on a single-threaded 
computer result in unrealizable demands for resources.11 
Four decades ago agent-based computing began to emerge Dahl [10]. Agent-based 
computing is an attractive form of asynchronicity because it relies on manageable 
parallelism—asynchronous computing threads that don’t result in an unrealizable 
demand for computing resources.  Its price is chaotic asynchronicity: minimally dif-
ferent event orderings may yield different results. 
4.1   Open and far-from-equilibrium computing 
Goldin and Wegner [11] have defined what they called persistent Turing Machines 
(and elsewhere interaction machines). These are Turing Machines that perform their 
computations over an indefinite period—continually accepting input and producing 
output without ever completing what might be understood as a traditional computa-
tion. Results of computations performed after accepting one input may be retained (on 
the machine’s “working tape”) and are available when processing future inputs. Al-
though Wegner’s focus is not on agent-based computing, his model is essentially that: 
agents which interact with their environments and maintain information between 
interactions. From here on we use the term agent to refer generically to an object that 
embodies a program which controls how it interacts with its environment. 
Goldin and Wegner claim that their “interactive finite computing agents are more 
expressive than Turing machines.” There has been much debate about this claim. We 
believe that to pose computability questions about agents is to ask the wrong question. 
We believe that what Wegner and Goldin have done is implicitly to have taken the 
same stance that we took explicitly above, i.e., to distinguish between the programs 
one can write and the functions those programs can compute.  
In making this implicit distinction Wegner and Goldin point out that one need not 
think of the program that a Turing Machine embodies in functional terms, i.e., as 
closed with respect to information flow. One can also think of a Turing Machine as 
open with respect to information flow. This parallels the distinction in physics be-
tween systems that are closed and open with respect to energy flows. Wegner has 
outlined this position most recently in [12]. Complex systems are famously far from 
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 If we get it to work on a useful scale quantum computing may be the first such thought tool. 
equilibrium with respect to environmental energy flows. Wegner and Goldin’s inter-
action machines (and agents in general) are similarly far from equilibrium with re-
spect to information flows.  
What might one gain from being open to information flows? An illustrative exam-
ple is Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). If one were to develop an optimized PD player for a 
one-shot PD exchange—since it’s one shot, the system is closed—it will Defect. 
Playing against itself, it will gain 1 point on each side—using the usual scoring rules. 
If one were to develop an optimized PD player to engage in an iterative PD se-
quence—the system is open—it will Cooperate indefinitely (presumably by playing a 
variant of Tit-for-Tat), gaining 3 points on each side at each time. Thus the same 
problem (PD) yields a different solution depending on whether one’s system is pre-
sumed to be open or closed with respect to information flows. 
4.2   Agents and their environments 
Computation involves the interaction of a process with its environment. In all cases 
with which we are familiar, the environment is modeled as a simply structured collec-
tion of symbols, e.g., a tape, a grid, etc. None of these models are adequate when 
compared to the real-world environment within which we actually find ourselves. We 
do not know how to model the multi-scalar face that nature presents to us—but almost 
certainly it won’t be as a tape or a grid.  
• In our actual environment new entities and new kinds of entities may come into 
existence. We are able to perceive and interact with them. We are aware of no 
formal environmental framework capable of representing such phenomena.  
• We do not understand the ultimate set of primitives—if indeed there are any—
upon which everything is built.  
We have referred [4] to these problems as the difficulty of looking upwards and the 
difficulty of looking downwards respectively.  
We are just beginning [4] to understand the nature of entities and of the multi-
scalar environment within which they exist. That environment involves entities on 
multiple levels, but it also involves forces at only the most primitive level. All other 
interactions are epiphenomenal. This is not simply a layered hierarchy, although it has 
some layered hierarchy properties. 
Given our lack of understanding about these issues it is not surprising that we have 
not been able to develop a formal model of such an environment.  Thus a fundamental 
open problem in computing is to develop a model of an environment that has the same 
sorts of multi-scalar properties as our real-life environment.  
Our revised version of the Church-Turing thesis gives us confidence that our cur-
rent understanding of agents as entities that embody programs is reasonably close to 
how we think about thinking. We are still quite far from the goal of formalizing ap-
propriate environments within which to situate such agents. 
4.2   The inevitable evolution and acceleration of intelligence 
As we saw in the PD example, thinking in terms of open computation models leads to 
different results from thinking in terms of closed models. Yet both use the same class 
of possible programs—whatever is programmable in a general purpose programming 
language. Since open computation models include the class of Oracle machines, com-
putability doesn’t seem like the appropriate perspective when analyzing these sys-
tems. Is there another approach? We suggest that the notion of results achieved is 
more relevant. In the PD case, the result achieved is the number of points scored. 
Under what other circumstances would it make sense to think of an agent in terms 
of results achieved? In [4] we discuss the nature of emergent entities. Static entities 
persist at an energy equilibrium in energy wells; but the more interesting dynamic 
entities persist only so long as they can extract energy from their environment.  
Unfortunately most agent-based computer models either ignore the issue of energy 
or treat it very superficially. We believe that an integrated theory of energy and in-
formation would clarify how information flows enable evolution. A real-world agent 
would be a dynamic entity that embodied some software. If, through a random muta-
tion, such an entity developed an enhanced ability to extract information from its 
environment then it will be more likely to survive—and, if capable of reproducing, 
reproduce. What evolves in this model is an enhanced ability to extract information 
from the environment. The need of dynamic entities for energy drives evolution to-
ward increasingly more powerful informational processing capabilities.12  
In this picture, information is being extracted from the environment at two levels. 
Each individual extracts information from the environment, which it processes as a 
way to help it find energy. Very simple real-life examples are plant tropisms and 
bacterial tendencies to follow nutrient gradients. More interestingly, the evolutionary 
process itself extracts information from the environment, which it then encodes (in 
DNA) as the “program” which individual agents use to process information from their 
environment. Thus the real intelligence is in the program, and the real information 
extracting activity is the evolutionary process which constructs the program.13  
Can evolution itself evolve? Is there something that will enable an entity to extract 
information from the environment more effectively? Modern society stores informa-
tion about how to process information from the environment as science. Can we go 
beyond science? Can the scientific process itself evolve? Science is the process of 
constructing mechanisms to extract and process information from the environment. 
Since science is a thought process, tools that enable us to externalize and improve our 
scientific thought processes will enhance our ability to do science. 
 
                                                          
12
 This seems to answer the question of whether evolution will always produce intelligence. It 
will whenever increased intelligence yields enhanced access to energy. 
13
 Attempts to model this process have failed because their environments are too poor. 
5   Conclusion 
An environmentally sophisticated agent-based paradigm involves agents, each of 
which has the computing capability of a Turing machine, situated in an environment 
that reveals itself reluctantly. Such an agent in a real-world environment is like an 
Oracle machine, with nature as the oracle. Combining agents with dynamic entities 
yields real-world agents, which (a) must extract energy from their environment to 
persist and (b) embody software capable of processing information flows from the 
environment. The agent-based thesis is that this paradigm represents how, at the start 
of the 21st century, we have externalized our thoughts about our place with the world.  
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